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A Time Series Analysis of the Effect
of Welfare Benefits on Earnings
MICHAEL ANTHONY LEWIS
State University of New York
School of Social Welfare at Stony Brook
Policy analysts Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward have put forth
a bargaining power model of earnings. More specifically, they have argued
that the higher workers' bargaining power, the higher their earnings and the
higher the level of welfare benefits, the higher workers' bargaining power.
Thus, based on Piven and Cloward's model, one would predict a positive
relationship between welfare benefit levels and earnings. Using time series
data I test Piven and Cloward's model and find support for it. The policy
implications of my findings are discussed.
An ongoing concern of mainstream labor economists is the
question what factors affect earnings. By mainstream labor econ-
omists I mean those who adhere to the neoclassical school of
thought in economics. An ongoing concern of policy analysts,
more generally, has been the effects of welfare. By welfare I mean
both the recently abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program as well as its replacement the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. As most readers
are probably aware, both programs provided or provide cash
benefits primarily to women with young children that they did
or do not have to engage in market work to receive.
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been little empirical work in la-
bor economics on the relationship between welfare benefit levels
and earnings. Social welfare policy experts more familiar to social
workers have long argued that there is a positive relationship
between welfare benefit levels and earnings, but there has been
little quantitative research in the field that test this proposition.
This paper focuses on the results of such a test.
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Literature Review
In 1971, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward published
their classic work Regulating the Poor. One of their central argu-
ments was that welfare benefits provide people with an alter-
native to selling their labor forcing employers to pay workers
earnings above the level of welfare to give them an incentive
to work. Piven and Cloward have made this argument in other
places (Piven and Cloward, 1985), and other social welfare policy
experts have proposed more recent versions of it (Blau, 1999 and
Abramovitz, 1996), yet there has been little quantitative research
in the policy literature familiar to social workers that has at-
tempted to test it.
A number of labor economists and other social scientists have
focused on the effects of welfare (Hoffman and Duncan, 1995;
Moffit, 1992; Lichter, et al., 1997; Fairlie and London, 1997; Lewis,
1999; Hoffman and Foster, 2000; and Blackburn, 2000) and the
factors that affect earnings (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Mavromaras
and Rudolp, 1997; Grogger and Eide, 1995; Bratsberg and Dek,
1998; Hirch and Stratton, 1997; Hamilton et al., 2000; Parent, 2000;
Carrington and Troske, 1998; and Hellerstein et al., 1999), yet there
has been little empirical research on the relationship between
welfare benefits and earnings. An exception is a paper by Moffit,
et al. (1998).
Moffit, et al. focused on the relative (to high-skilled workers)
and absolute decline in the wages of low-skilled workers that
occurred throughout much of the past 25 years or so. They at-
tempted to determine whether this decline impacted on welfare
benefits that is they modeled welfare benefits as the dependent
variable with decline in low-skilled workers' wages the indepen-
dent one. They found a positive relationship between decline in
low-skilled workers' wages and welfare benefits and state that
this may be due to two possible mechanisms.
One is that voters prefer to maintain a constant ratio of welfare
benefits to the wages of low-skilled workers and pressures legis-
lators to lower welfare benefits when this ratio increases (that is
when wages decrease). Moffit, et al. argue that voters might prefer
a constant ratio of welfare to low-skilled workers' wages out of
a sense that it would be unfair for the well being of low-skilled
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workers to decline relative to that of welfare recipients. For exam-
ple, suppose the average welfare stipend were one-half the aver-
age wage of low-skilled workers and this average wage declined.
As Moffit, et al. see it, voters, motivated by the considerations
discussed above, might pressure legislators to decrease welfare.
The other mechanism that could account for Moffit, et al.'s
finding has more to do with the work disincentive that would
result from a decline in the wages of low-skilled workers. If low-
skilled workers wages were to decline, raising the welfare to low-
skilled wages ratio, workers might be more inclined to go on
welfare. Voters concerned, about this disincentive effect, might
pressure legislators to reduce welfare benefits.
The fact that Mofitt, et al. focused on the affect of the relative
as well as absolute decline in low-skilled workers' wages means
that they were focusing, in part, on the impact of an increase in
wage inequality on welfare benefit levels. I focused, instead, on
the impact of welfare benefits on average monthly earnings; that
is I modeled welfare as the independent and the average monthly
earnings as the dependent variable. Also, unlike Mofitt et al., I
focused not on the preferences of voters but on how welfare ben-
efit levels might affect the bargaining power of potential workers
versus employers.
The Model
Piven and Cloward (1971 and 1985) propose a bargaining
power model of earnings. That is they posit that workers' earn-
ings depend on the relative bargaining power of workers versus
employers and that this relative bargaining power depends on the
alternate, other than earnings, sources of subsistence available to
workers. If the only way workers are able to subsist is by selling
their labor to some employer earnings are likely to be relatively
low. If workers have the option of subsisting without having to
sell their labor earnings are likely to be higher and the higher this
non-work conditioned source of subsistence the higher earnings
are likely to be. In the United States one source of subsistence
that people did and do not have to sell their labor for was and
is AFDC and TANE Thus, if Piven and Cloward are correct one
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would expect to find higher welfare benefit levels associated with
higher earnings.
To test Piven and Cloward's thesis I estimated a time series
regression model of the natural logarithm of monthly earnings
(measured in current dollars) on the natural logarithm of monthly
welfare benefits (measured in current dollars). This allowed me to
obtain an estimate of the effect of welfare benefits on earnings that
gives the percentage change in earnings for each percentage point
change in welfare benefits, controlling for the other independent
variables in the model. I also took the natural logarithms of the
control variables (discussed below). Proceeding this way allowed
me to compare the effect of welfare on earnings to the effects
of my control variables on earnings, enabling me to determine
which of my independent variables had the biggest impact on
earnings. Taking logarithms of variables to compare the relative
effects of different independent variables is a standard approach
in quantitative work, especially in economics (Wooldridge, 2000).
Using OLS regression I estimated the following model:
1. In earningst = ot fl In welfaret + P2 In educt + P3 In unempt
+ 84time+ c,
where "In" stands for the natural logarithm, "a" a constant, and
"t" stands for a given year. Thus, 81I is the effect of the In of welfare
in year "t" on the In of earnings in the same year, and 2, 83, and
P4 are defined similarly. et stands for the error in a given year,
that is the difference between the actual In of earnings value and
predicted In of earnings value in a given year.
I included lneduct in the equation because previous research
has found a positive relationship between education and earnings
(Grogger and Eide, 1995). A theoretical explanation for such a
relationship comes from human capital theory (HCT). Accord-
ing to HCT (Becker, 1993), more education makes workers more
productive and, since labor markets function so that there is a
positive relationship between productivity and earnings, more
productive workers make more than less productive ones. An
alternative explanation contends that more education doesn't
cause workers to become more productive but, instead, signals to
employers who the more productive workers are. The idea is that
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more productive persons find it easier (or less costly) to acquire
more schooling than less productive ones do. Thus, employers
use rigorous educational standards for hiring to screen out less
productive workers and pay those who meet these standards
in accordance with their higher productivity (Hamermesh and
Rees, 1993).
I included lnunempt because previous research has found
a negative relationship between unemployment and earnings
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). Bowles and Schor provide a
theoretical explanation for this relationship. They posit that the
extent to which workers can pressure employers to raise pay,
through strikes and other actions, depends on the cost to workers
of losing their jobs. The cost of losing one's job (through being
fired, laid off, etc.) depends, among other things, on the likelihood
of finding another job (that is on the unemployment rate). The
higher the unemployment rate the higher the cost of job loss, and
the higher the cost of job loss the less employers can get away
with paying workers.
Time was included to control for unobserved variables that
change over time and affect earnings.
Data
I used data from the Economic Report of the President (Council of
Economic Advisors, 1997), A Statistical Portrait of the United States
(Littman, Mark S., 1998), and The Green Book (United States House
of Representatives, 1998). The data was a time series covering
1960-1995. For each year I took the natural logarithms of the
following variables:
1. average private sector weekly earnings (measured in current
dollars)
2. average monthly AFDC benefit for families (measured in cur-
rent dollars)
3. civilian unemployment rate
4. proportion of United States residents at least 25 years old that
has completed four years of college
I estimated the impact of unobservable variables that change over
time by including each year as values for a time variable. In other
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words, 1960, 1961, 1962 ... 1995 were the values for my time
variable.
Ideally, it would have been instructive to include data on
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) the reformed
version of AFDC, but data limitations made this infeasible. How-
ever, since TANF is just another form of non-wage income, if
Piven and Cloward's model is valid TANF's effect on the relative
bargaining power of workers versus employers and, therefore,
earnings should be similar to AFDC's. Future research is needed
to examine the extent of this similarity.
Results
Table I contains the results from my regression model.
Recall that taking natural logarithms of the variables in the
model allows for estimates of the percentage change in average
weekly earnings for each percentage point change in a given
independent variable, controlling for the other independent vari-
ables in the model. Such an estimate is called the elasticity of
the dependent variable with respect to the given independent
variable (Nicholson, 1989).
As expected, the elasticity of average weekly earnings with
respect to welfare is positive and statistically significant; for each
percentage point increase in average monthly AFDC benefits
earnings increase by .44 percent. The elasticity of earnings with
Table 1
Effect of Lnwelfaret on Lnearningst
Variables Slopes T Values Significance
Constant -23.49 -3.40 .003
Lnunempt .06 1.72 .100
Lnwelfaret .44 3.82 .001
Lneduct .72 4.31 .000
Time .01 3.34 .003
F = 1026.68, Significance .000
Adjusted R Squared = .85
D.W. = 1.2
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respect to the proportion of 25 and above year old four-year
college graduates is .71 and with respect to time is .01. A one-
percentage point change in the unemployment rate produces a .06
percent change in earnings, but this effect is statistically insignif-
icant. It's clear that the elasticity of earnings with respect to edu-
cation is larger than any other independent variable in the model.
The adjusted R squared for the model is .85 meaning that 85%
of the variation in Inearningst is explained by the independent
variables in the model. This adjusted R squared "nets out" the
effect of time on lnearningst. In other words, .85 is the amount of
variation in lnearningst explained by the other three variables in
the model, controlling for the amount explained by time. This
type of goodness-of-fit measure is the preferred one when an
analyst models a dependent variable that is affected by a time
trend, as is the case here. See Wooldridge (2000) for details on
how to compute an adjusted R squared that removes the affect
of a time trend as well as the justification of this approach. Note
that an adjusted R squared of .85 is very high by social science
standards.
The D.W. located beneath the table stands for the Durban-
Watson d statistic, a test of the extent to which the errors in the
regression model are correlated with one another. Referring back
to equation #1, if we solve for Et we get:
2. Et= In earnings, - a - fl IIn welfare, - PB2 In educt
- P3 In unempt - fl4time
the expression for the error at a given point in time. The D.W.
statistic assesses the extent to which these errors are correlated
(a condition called serial correlation). Serial correlation increases
the likelihood that an analyst will assume that there is a relation-
ship between the dependent variable and a given independent
variable when this is not the case. A D.W. statistic of 1.2 is within
the indeterminate range, meaning that we do not have enough
evidence to reach a conclusion about the likelihood of serial cor-
relation (Studenmund, 1997). The standard remedy for dealing
with this situation is obtaining more observations, but, in the
present case, lack of available data made this infeasible. Thus,
this strategy will have to be used in future research.
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Discussion
This paper has focused on the relationship between wel-
fare and earnings. The inspiration is an argument first put for-
ward in the policy literature familiar to social workers by Piven
and Cloward (1971). Consistent with the theoretical prediction, I
found that welfare benefits are positively related to earnings, as
were education and time. The elasticity of earnings with respect
to lneduct was the highest in the model, suggesting that the
proportion of adults that have graduated from a four-year college
has the largest effect on earnings. What are the policy implications
of these findings?
For those, like many social workers, who believe government
should play a role in curtailing poverty, it is instructive to consider
the obvious fact that poverty (whether absolutely or relatively
defined) is related to income. One of the major sources of income is
earnings. Thus, if government can affect earnings, this is a means
of affecting the poverty rate.
The data discussed in this paper suggest that government
can increase earnings more by increasing the proportion of 25
and above year olds that graduate from four-year colleges than
by increasing welfare benefits. Yet government can more directly
affect the welfare benefit level than the proportion of four-year
college graduates. To increase college graduation the government
would have to implement an incentive scheme such as subsidiz-
ing the costs of a college education. Many would respond to this
incentive but many would not because the subsidy would only
address some of the costs of education. The cost of forgone wages
would still deter many from attending.
In order to increase welfare benefits, all the federal govern-
ment would have to do is send recipients more money. It is very
unlikely that many, if any, recipients would decline this increase.
Although the government could do more to increase earnings
by increasing educational attainment than welfare benefits, it
might be more prudent to try to accomplish this goal by the latter
method since it has more control over welfare benefits than the
proportion of people that finish college.
Another way government can increase earnings is, of course,
by raising the minimum wage. According to many economists,
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increases in the minimum wage increase unemployment among
low-skilled workers (Brown, 1988). According to more recent
work in economics, however, increases in the minimum wage
do not necessarily increase unemployment (Card and Krueger,
1995). The fact that there is some evidence that higher minimum
wages cause higher unemployment among low-skilled workers
should give those concerned about the well being of the poor
pause.
The strategy of increasing welfare benefits might run into
its own problems though. The paper by Moffit, et al. discussed
above as well as recent welfare reforms suggest that the electorate
might not be interested in raising the level of welfare benefits
and, perhaps, may be more interested in lowering them. If this
paper's findings are accurate, the electorate, by declining to raise
benefits or by lowering them, would be forgoing an opportunity
to increase the well being of workers. Since most members of the
electorate are workers they would be forgoing an opportunity to
increase their own well being.
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